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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine whether international 
investment incentives can be justified on the host country effects of foreign 
direct investments. In particular, we discuss whether the externalities from 
the operations of foreign multinational corporations are strong and 
systematic enough to justify subsidizing foreign investment with various 
fiscal and financial incentives. We also discuss some alternative policy 
measures available for governments to benefit from inward foreign 
investment
Based on the current knowledge of spillovers, we try to see whether 
investment incentives can be justified or not, and discusses the design of 
incentive policies. 
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As most countries have liberalized their policies to attract investments from 
foreign multinational corporations an increasing number of host governments 
provide various forms of investment incentives to encourage foreign owned companies 
to invest in their countries. These include fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and 
lower taxes for foreign investors, financial incentives such as grants and preferential 
loans to multinational corporations, as well as measures like market preferences, 
infrastructure, and sometimes even monopoly rights. 
There are some explanation about the increasing interest for investments like 
low growth rates and rising unemployment but it appears that the globalization and 
regionalization of the international economy have made foreign direct investments 
incentives more interesting and important for national governments. 
Even a small country may now compete for foreign direct investments, given 
that it can provide a sufficiently attractive incentive package. At the same time, national 
decision – makers have lost many of the instruments traditionally used to promote local 
competitiveness, employment and welfare 
 The scope for active trade policy has diminished as a result of successful trade 
liberalization, and the internationalization of capital markets has limited the possibilities 
to use exchange rate policy as a tool to influence relative competitiveness. 
Most clearly, this has been seen in Europe, where the Single Market program 
has shifted the responsibility for trade and exchange rate policies from national 
governments to the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Even so, 
national decision – makers continues to promote their competitiveness and welfare 
using those policy instruments that remain at their disposal, including foreign direct 
investments incentives. 150
Revista Tinerilor Economi ti
In order to compete successfully in a foreign market a firm must possess some 
ownership-specific assets in knowledge, technology, organization, management, or 
marketing skills. Such firm has several alternative ways to claim the rents that they will 
yield in foreign markets, including subsidiary production, joint ventures, licensing, 
franchising, management contracts, marketing contracts, and turnkey contracts. Of 
these, subsidiary production and joint ventures involve varying degrees of foreign 
presence, and force the firm to decide where to locate their foreign activity. 
In the past, the view was that multi national corporations are mainly attracted 
by strong economies based on market size and the level of real income, with skill levels 
in the host economy, the availability of infrastructure and other resources that facilitate 
efficient specialization of production, trade policies, and political and macroeconomic 
stability. Foreign direct investments was market seeking. Foreign investors seeking an 
export base were less focused on local market size and more concerned about relative 
cost of production, while investment incentives were seen as relatively minor 
determinants of foreign direct investment decisions. 
In recent years the view of the importance of incentives begins to change and 
one indication is the proliferation of investment incentives across the world. Very few 
countries compete for foreign investments without any form of subsidies today. With 
the exception of export processing zones and industrial estates, where infrastructure and 
land are subsidized, developing countries are more likely to base their incentive 
schemes on tax holidays and other fiscal measures that do not require direct payments 
of scarce public funds. Direct financial subsidies are likely to have their main influence 
on the location decision itself, while tax holidays may well effect operational decisions 
for several years. 
Recent econometric studies on the effects of foreign direct investments 
incentives, in particular fiscal preferences, suggest that they have become more 
significant determinants of international direct investment flows in spite of that most 
foreign direct investment incentives apply in particular to greenfield investments rather 
than foreign acquisition of existing companies.  
The main reason for that is the internalization of world economy. Global trade 
liberalization has made easier for multi national corporations to set up international 
production networks, so that a larger share of output is shipped to international 
customers or affiliated companies in other countries rather than sold to local customers. 
This has reduced the impact of market size and allowed smaller countries to compete 
for investments that would automatically have been directed to the major markets in the 
past.
Regional integration has similar effects, allowing multi national corporations to 
supply all or several member states from a single location within the region. Incentives 
have also become increasingly important for national policymakers who are trying to 
promote local production, employment and welfare. The scope for active national trade 
and exchange rate policy has diminished, most clearly for present and potential 
European Union members, who are largely bound by decisions taken by the European 
Union Commission and the European Central Bank, and shifted attention to industrial 
policy, including measures such as investment incentives.  
As a result, the incentives provided by many countries have become more 
generous over the years. Considering that market integration has reached further at the 
regional rather than global level, it is also clear that the effects of incentives are likely 
to be particularly strong in the competition for foreign direct investment within regions, 151
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when the initial investment decision has been taken and the investor is choosing 
between alternative locations in a given region. 
The problem is that investment incentives are or are not likely to yield benefits 
that are at least as large as the costs and if those costs are justified. 
Even if the foreign multi national corporation do not differ in any fundamental 
way from local firms, the costs of the initial investment incentive could arguably be 
recouped over time as the economy grows thanks to the foreign direct investment 
inflows. However, there are at least two arguments against this type of incentives. It is 
difficult to make reliable calculations about the expected future benefits in terms of 
growth, employment, or tax revenue, which is necessary to determine how large the 
subsidies should be. This is particularly complex in cases where foreign direct 
investments projects that are driven by investment incentives rather than economic 
fundamentals of the host country. 
The reason is that these investors are likely to be relatively footloose, and could 
easily decide to move on to other locations offering even more generous incentives 
before the expected benefits in the first location have been realized. 
Furthermore if foreign investors do not differ in any fundamental way from 
local investors subsidizing foreign direct investments may distort competition and 
generate significant losses among local firms. 
Thus, it is hard to justify investment incentives focusing on foreign multi 
national corporations that do not differ fundamentally from local companies. At the 
same time, it should be noted that this conclusion does not rule out public policy 
intervention in the form of investment subsidies in situations where unemployment, 
insufficient investment, or weak growth are central policy problems. Instead, the policy 
prescription is that the problems should be addressed with policies that do not 
differentiate between foreign and local investors. 
In the more realistic case where conditions for foreign firms differ from those 
for local firms, it is easier to motivate foreign direct investments incentives with the 
argument that there may be some distortion or market failure that is specific to multi 
national corporation production. The most obvious distortions occur if rules and 
regulations are biased against foreign owners. In such cases foreign direct investment 
incentives may well be needed to overcome the various obstacles faced by foreign 
investors.
Supposing there is no formal discrimination of foreign owners, controlling for 
this, the most common source of market failure is related to externalities or spillovers of 
foreign direct investment. 
A firm must possess some asset in the form of knowledge of a public-good 
character to be able to compete in foreign markets. 
If the multinational corporation cannot capture all quasi-rents due to its 
productive activities in the host economy, or if the affiliate increases the competitive 
pressure and removes distortions, the host country’s private sector can gain indirectly 
when productivity spills over to locally owned firms. Thus, when markets fail to reflect 
the social benefits of the foreign direct investment, government action can be justified 
to bridge the gap between social and private return for foreign direct investment 
projects that create positive spillovers.
The increase in competitiveness may attract further foreign investors into the 
country, raising national income and welfare. This motivates the host country to 
subsidize foreign direct investment, in competition with other host countries that see the 152
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same potential gains. Differences in country size, production costs and expected gains 
from foreign direct investments inflows influence each country’s optimal incentive 
scheme. 
The equilibrium distribution of foreign direct investments between countries 
with subsidies may well be significantly different from that without subsidies even in a 
perfect information setting, where each country implements its optimal incentive 
scheme. Foreign direct investment incentives can be expected to have a significant 
impact on the pattern of international investment. 
Although the rationale for subsidizing inward foreign direct investments is to 
correct the failure of markets to reflect spillover benefits, it should be noted that neither 
policy making nor formal theory have focused much effort on matching the size of 
subsidies to the amount of expected spillover benefits. Instead, it is assumed that the 
spillover benefits are sufficiently large to justify investment incentives. In other words, 
few commentators have assessed the empirical evidence regarding spillovers in 
connection with this particular policy debate. 
Based on the argument that foreign firms can promote economic development 
and growth, many countries have introduced various investment incentives to
encourage foreign multi national corporations to invest in their market. Such incentives 
can mainly be justified if the foreign firms differ from local companies in that they 
possess some firm specific intangible asset that can spill over to local firms. In that 
case, the foreign investor’s private benefits are lower than the social benefits and total 
foreign investment will fall short of the optimal amount unless various investment 
incentives compensate the foreign investor. 
There are good reasons to remain cautious in granting incentives focusing 
exclusively on foreign investors. It is not easy to determine where and how spillovers 
will occur. 
It is also difficult to calculate the value of these externalities, which is 
important, since national welfare will increase only if the investment incentive is 
smaller than the value of externality. If the subsidies are larger than what is motivated 
by the externalities, the host country will not only lose public revenue, but the 
incentives will also discriminate against local firms that may lose jobs and market 
shares.
Competition among governments to attract foreign direct investments may 
create problems. When most governments compete actively for foreign direct 
investments, it is difficult for any individual country to stay out of bidding contests, 
which effectively shift profits from the host country to multinational enterprises. 
One reason is of course that strong promotion efforts show that the 
government is actively doing something to strengthen employment, productivity, 
growth, or some other policy objective. 
Another reason is that some of the perceived benefits are easily observable 
while some of the costs are distributed over long periods of time and hard to measure. 
Consequently, there is a tendency to overbid and the subsidies may very well surpass 
the level of spillover benefits, with welfare losses as a result. 
In the same way as investment incentives may be politically attractive in the 
short run, but costly in the long run, protectionism may also promote local employment 
and production in the short run at a high long run cost. 
In the trade area, the path away from beggar-thy-neighbour policies has been 
multilateral negotiations where trade liberalization is coordinated across countries. It is 153
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clear than similar solutions would be first best also in foreign direct investment policy, 
in particular at the regional level. However, although several multilateral agreements 
include clauses on incentives and investment rules, their coverage remains limited. 
In the European Union, investment incentives are in principle restricted to 
areas qualifying for regional assistance. 
In the absence of multilateral agreements on investment, it is therefore likely 
that many countries will continue subsidizing foreign direct investments. 
The potential for spillovers is not likely to be realized unless local firms have 
the ability and motivation to learn from foreign multinational corporations and to invest 
in new technology. Consequently, investment incentives aiming to increase the 
potential for spillovers may be inefficient unless they are complemented with measures 
to improve the local learning capability and to maintain a competitive local business 
environment. 
This suggests first and foremost that the incentives should be rules-based and 
available on equal terms to all investors irrespective of industry and nationality of 
investor, rather than based on discretionary decisions. 
The motive for supporting foreign investors, including existing investors that 
may consider expanding their activities, is to equalize social and private returns to 
investment. But there is a difference between social and private returns only if local 
firms are actually able to absorb some of the potential spill over benefits, and this does 
not occur automatically. Hence, to justify foreign direct investment incentives, there is a 
reason to simultaneously subsidize local firms to strengthen their capacity to absorb 
foreign technology and skills. 
Governments should also consider their efforts to modernize infrastructure, 
raise the level of education and labour skills, and improve the overall business climate 
as parts of their investment promotion policy. These are important components of the 
economic fundamentals that determine the location of foreign direct investments. In 
addition to attracting foreign direct investments and facilitating the realization of 
spillovers, these policies will also promote growth and development of local industry. 
This, after all, is one of the ultimate goals of government intervention in general. 
Foreign direct investment can play an important role in raising a country’s 
technological level, creating new employment and promoting economic growth. 
Many countries are therefore actively trying to attract foreign investors in order 
to promote their economic development, particularly at times when the country’s 
domestic growth prospects appear weak. However, designing efficient incentive 
programs is complicated task, and the competition between host governments trying to 
attract foreign direct investments is likely to complicate the task further, as it tends to 
shift profits and welfare from the host countries to foreign multinationals. 
Many countries will continue using foreign direct investments incentives as 
important policy tools. 
The use of investment incentives focusing exclusively on foreign firms is 
generally not an efficient way to raise national welfare. 
The main reason is that the strongest theoretical motive for financial subsidies 
to inward foreign direct investment – spillovers of foreign technology and skills to local 
industry – is not an automatic consequence of foreign investment. 
The potential spillover benefits are realized only if local firms have the ability 
and motivation to invest in absorbing foreign technologies and skills. 154
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To motivate subsidization of foreign investment, it is therefore necessary, at the 
same time, to support learning and investment in local firms as well.  
Good governance in the area of foreign direct investments policy is to consider 
the investment incentive packages as part of the country’s overall industrial policy, and 
make any incentives available on equal terms to all investors, foreign as well as local. 
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